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Monetary authorities have been implicated in the financial crisis of 2007-2008.  
John  Muellbauer,  for  example,  has  blamed  what  he  thought  was  initially 
inadequate policy responses by central banks to the crisis on their models, which 
are, in his words, “overdue for the scrap heap”.  This paper investigates the role 
of monetary policy models in the crisis and finds that (i) it is likely that monetary 
policy contributed to the financial crisis and (ii) that an inappropriately narrow 
suite  of models made  this mistake  easier.   The  core  models currently  used  at 
prominent  central  banks  were  not  designed  to  discover  emergent  financial 
fragility. In that respect John Muellbauer is right.  But the implications drawn here 
are  less  dramatic  than  his:  while  the  representative  agent  approach  to 
microfoundations  now  seems  indefensible,  other  aspects  of  modern 
macroeconomics  are  not  similarly  suspect.  The  case  made  here  is  rather  for 
expanding  the  suite  of  models  used  in  the  regular  deliberations  of  monetary 
authorities,  with  new  models  that  give  explicit  roles  to  the  financial  sector,  to 
money  and  to  the  process  of  exchange.  Recommending  a  suite  of  models  for 
policy making entails no methodological innovation. That is what central banks 
do;  though,  of  course,  how  they  do  it  is  open  to  improvement.  The 
methodological innovation is the inclusion of a model that would be sensitive to 
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In October 2008, with the financial crisis worsening seemingly by the day, John Muellbauer  (2008) 
asked  ―Why Europe’s key central banks made this potentially catastrophic error...‖ and found ―one 
reason...rests in their econometric models, based on fashionable but outdated economic theory‖.  The 
widely used models, he continued, ―were overdue for the scrap heap‖.   
This is surprising talk indeed in light of the remarkable consensus that had developed on the theory and 
practice of monetary policy over the preceding 30 years (Goodfriend, 2007; Mishkin, 2007). So strong 
was the consensus that Stephen Grenville (2001) at the Reserve Bank of Australia wondered just a few 
years earlier whether the ―history‖ of monetary policy - read in the tradition of Fukuyama’s (1992) - had 
ended with inflation targeting; to his credit, he argued, no.  But it is not just another application of 
Fukuyama that is wrong for critics like Muellbauer: not only is there a future beyond the consensus 
model, the consensus was itself deeply flawed.   
The crisis has called into question: the goals of monetary policy (Morgan, 2009), the models used by 
central bankers (Muellbauer, 2009), the theory upon which they are based (Buiter, 2009), and even the 
perceived ideology of central bankers (e.g. Kaufman, 2009; Sachs, 2009). It is the criticism against the 
models used by monetary authorities and the methodological implications for such models that form 
the focus of this paper.  These methodological implications are written in small caps (see, for example, 
Boland, 2001), they are about adapting existing models and suggesting new ones that work ―better‖ (in 
ways defined below), and not about large questions in epistemology or the philosophy of science.   
Prior to the crisis and despite the favourable assessment of monetary policy at the time, a number of 
small ―m‖ methodological questions were considered open.  The crisis has highlighted the importance 
of these questions and I will focus my attention here on those questions that are in some way directly 
related to the run-up or unfolding of the crisis.  Specifically I will draw two methodological lessons: 
First, Muellbauer has a point, there are serious flaws with the current crop of core policy models and 
some new ones are needed; second, expanding the suite of models used by central banks to include 
some with the features described in this paper (including a prominent role for financial intermediaries) 
would have made it harder for the Fed and other banks to follow the policy path that preceded the 
crisis. This lesson holds whether you think that path was a substantial deviation from the consensus 
policy  model  (e.g.  Taylor,  2009)  or  followed  from  a  reasonable  application  of  that  model  (e.g. 
Bernanke, 2010).   
4 
2. Monetary policy and asset markets 
The Financial crisis that emerged in 2007 originated in the market for residential property in the United 
States, but soon spread to other asset markets in the US and internationally, eventually leading to a full-
blown banking crisis that pushed economies around the world into the deepest recession many had 
seen in the Post-War era.  The crisis was due to a compounding of errors in housing markets (in the US 
and elsewhere) and in the markets for derivative instruments
1.   
Briefly,  the  crisis  orig inated  with  an  inappropriate  investment  strategy  in  residential  property, 
compounded by financial market instruments that changed the nature of and obscured the associated 
risks, thereby weakening the balance sheets of highly geared financial institutions.   A modern run-on-
banks ensued in the interbank market and caused an international banking crisis with large output and 
employment losses (Almunia et al., 2009).   
What role if any, did monetary policy play in (i) creating the environment for the crisis and (ii) allowing 
it to unfold?  Starting with the housing market we can think of acts of omission and commission by 
especially the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) and other central banks that either encouraged the housing 
boom, or allowed it to run unchecked.   Starting with acts of omission, these is little evidence that 
monetary authorities used policy instrument directly to contain the boom (which had both price and 
quantity aspects) in residential property.  They were implementing the modern consensus - perhaps the 
most widely-known formulation is Bernanke and Gertler (1999)  -  that central banks should not 
respond ex ante to asset market fluctuations over and above the consequences of these fluctuations for 
the outlook on inflation and real output
2,3.  Financial stability and price stability is complementary under 
(explicit or implicit) flexible inflation targeting in this view (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999: 18, 22).   
There are good reasons for not incorporating asset prices as a distinct objective of the interest rate 
policy of monetary authorities
4, including (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999; Goodhart, 2005; Blinder, 2005; 
Mishkin, 2007):  first, the knowledge problem that central banks would have to identify unjustifiable 
asset price movements more accurately than  the financial markets.  For example, an important 
statement of the case for direct targeting of asset prices, by Genberg, Lipsky, Cecchetti and Wadhwani, 
                                                 
1 There are a number of excellent accounts of the crisis, such as Blanchard (2009) and Almunia, Bénétrix and Eichengreen 
(2009) and recently Roberts (2010) with a focus on the changes in financial sector incentives. The text focuses on those 
aspects most closely related to monetary policy and, consequently, misses a lot of the detail (especially of an institutional 
kind) in these broader accounts.  
2  This was one of the less widely shared notions in the modern consensus on monetary policy.  Or to be more precise it 
was one of the elements of the consensus which many monetary economists and central bankers felt was more open to 
further research and experience (Goodfriend, 2005; Mishkin, 2007).  
3 Note that Bernanke and Gertler (1999) did not recommend policy paralysis, on the contrary they reasoned that ―...asset 
price crashes have done sustained damage to the economy only in cases when monetary policy remained unresponsive or 
actively reinforced deflationary pressures‖ (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999: 18).  And it seemed that the required response was 
precisely the response indicated by a flexible inflation targeting system.   
4 While ―monetary policy‖ typically means the interest rate policy of a modern central bank, there are other instruments 
available to central banks, including reserve requirements, quantitative adjustments to the monetary base and usually a role 
in the regulation of financial sector firms (Borio and Disyatat, 2009).   
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(2000), assumed that the central bank knew when an asset market boom had turned into a bubble.  
That, however, is what central banks do not generally know, neither ex ante nor always even ex post.  
Second, the volatility of asset prices and the tenuous link between the stance of monetary policy and 
asset  market  outcomes,  risks  undermining  the  credibility  of  the  monetary  authorities.    Third,  an 
important lesson of monetary policy in the 20
th century was that more successful central banks focussed 
their  attention  narrowly  on  the  ―correct‖  objectives  (such  as  price  stability  and  stable  real  output 
around capacity) and did not get distracted by pursuing a myriad of goals.  Targeting asset prices would 
undermine that focus of monetary policy by requiring contradicting policy adjustments depending on 
the nature of the shock to the markets.  Finally, there are other instruments at the disposal of the 
central  bank  (or  the  government  depending  on  institutional  arrangements),  such  as  financial 
regulations, that may be more suited to addressing the risks of asset price volatility.  
Such was the consensus prior to the crisis, but the severity of the episode has encouraged revision of 
this ―mop up afterwards‖ approach to asset bubbles
5 (e.g. Mishkin, 2008 and Blinder, 2008). A finer 
distinction  is now  being drawn between  types of asset  price  bubbles,  with the  old  consensus still 
applicable for bubbles on the stock market and where bank credit played a small part (―equity bubbles‖ 
in the terminology of Mishkin, 2008), but not for asset bubbles where the provision of cheap credit by 
banks play a central role (―credit bubbles‖ in the terminology of Mishkin, 2008).   
In these credit bubbles neither the knowledge problem nor the instrument problem is likely to be as 
severe as suggested above, or so the argument goes. A central bank that also plays a role as bank 
regulator and supervisor has much better information about bank lending and potentially about the 
prudence of that lending
6 compared with knowledge about the fundamental support for stock market 
prices. And central banks have a range of regulatory powers that can be used t o reign in credit lending 
that is supporting an asset bubble, instruments that act directly on the behaviour of banks.  
This distinction is sensible and is a lens through which plausible  ex post readings of cases such as the 
―Great crash‖ of 1929, the Japanese asset price boom and bust and the recent financial crisis have been 
offered by Mishkin (2008). But to act against credit bubbles requires an ex ante reading and there is not 
much evidence that the Fed (or other major Central Banks) were able to do that with respect to the 
recent  crisis.  Indeed,  former  Fed  Deputy  Governor  Alan  Blinder  considered  the  risks  to  various 
dimensions of US monetary policy in August 2005 (when the credit bubble was well under way) and 
summarised  his  results  in  a  risk  management  matrix.  It  indicated  moderate  risks  to  inflation, 
employment and aggregate demand and a high risk of a supply side shock. Crucially, he identified the 
                                                 
5 Blinder (2005) argued that the ―mop up‖ approach passed a ―severe‖ stress test with the unwinding of the Dotcom bubble 
from 2000 to 2002.  
6 For Mishkin (2008) a prerequisite for taking policy action against even a credit bubble is that the bubble reflects market 
failure of some kind.    
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level of risk for both the banking sector and credit risk to be low, stable and covered by strong risk 
management (Blinder, 2005: Table 1).  
It is the central argument of this paper that methodological changes are necessary to the models used in 
assessing monetary policy  such an observer in  Blinder’s (2005) position would  have identified the 
emerging credit and banking sector risks. Without these changes the distinction between credit and 
equity bubbles bring Central Banks no closer to a practical engagement with the risks of asset bubbles.  
3. The ―Great deviation‖ 
If the Fed did not use the stance of policy to prevent the housing boom from accelerating, nor the 
associated development in the derivative markets, these events could still have been influenced by what 
the  Fed  did  do.  The  Bernanke-Gertler  consensus  on  the  role  for  asset  prices  requires  monetary 
authorities to care about asset prices to the extent that they affect the outlook for price stability and the 
output gap.  But that is precisely what the Fed did not do from 2002 until 2006, according to the 
argument John Taylor has forcefully presented in a series of papers and summarised in Taylor (2009).   
Between 2002 and 2006 the target Federal Funds Rate deviated further and longer from the path 
prescribed  by  the  Taylor  rule  for  any  period  since  the  1970s;  Taylor  has  called  it  the  ―Great 
Deviation‖
7. Taylor’s argument is that the Federal Reserve board fuelled the housing boom, and the 
associated financial market gearing, by keeping interest rates too low for too long 
What accounts for this ―Great Deviation‖?  Poole (2007: 5) suggested that the Taylor rule as used for 
the 1980s and 1990s would not track the actual policy well after 2000 because (i) the Fed decided to use 
the Personal Consumption Expenditure price index (PCE) as the focus for it’s deliberations on price 
stability at that time and (ii) decided to emphasise core PCE (excluding food and energy), as opposed to 
the headline index.  To the extent that Core PCE inflation was lower than headline CPI inflation over 
this period Taylor’s rule would not give an accurate description of systematic policy at the Fed.   
This is an empirical argument and easily checked by comparing the interest rate recommended by the 
Taylor rule based on the CPI headline inflation with the same rule’s recommend interest rate based on 
the Core PCE inflation. There is something in the Poole argument: using Core PCE (and the same 
Taylor rule specification) would have resulted in a lower recommended Fedfunds rate over this period, 
notably in 2005 and 2006.  But this difference doesn't explain the pattern observed by Taylor, who 
observed deviations of 2-3% from the  Taylor rule  in  2002,  2003  and 2004,  while the  price  index 
adjustment recommended by Poole would leave a gap of 0.5 to 1.5% over that period, rising to 2 tot 
3% in 2005, i.e. when John Taylor found the gap between the policy rate and the Taylor rule closing 
                                                 
7 William Poole – then chief executive of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis – observed the same in 2007 (Poole, 2007).  
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rapidly.  Adopting Core PCE as opposed to CPI does not, therefore, explain the pattern of deviations 
observed by John Taylor.  
The second term in the Taylor rule is the output gap and an analogous argument to Poole’s might be 
used here to explain the observed path of the Fedfunds rate.   Monetary authorities operate with 
considerable uncertainty about prevailing economic conditions, the transmission mechanism and as a 
combination of these with notable uncertainty about the likely future path of inflation, output and 
other variables of interest.  The methodology of monetary policy can and does account for these 
sources of uncertainty
8.  If the current estimates of GDP over the relevant period is much higher than 
the contemporary estimates then the Taylor rule with current estimates would show a higher 
recommended interest rate path than would have been apparent at the time the policy decisions were 
taken. The same is true with respect to PCE inflation.    
While Poole (2007) used real-time Congressional Budget Office estimates of the output gap when he 
identified the ―Great Deviation‖ it is now possible to use the Green Book ―nowcasts‖ of data used by 
the FOMC in real time policy making
9. But the difference between the real-time and revised estimates 
of GDP for this period was unbiased (no systematic under or over-estimation) and provides no clue to 
the ―Great deviation‖.  
The same is not true of the gap between the real-time and revised PCE inflation data though. More 
specifically, Bernanke (2010) showed that using the real time forecasts of PCE inflation in a Taylor rule 
(as opposed to the revised historical data) accounts for almost the entire ―Great Deviation‖. This 
argument is consistent with Fed communication of the period, when it was known to be concerned 
                                                 
8 The awareness of the data constraints under which policy is made in real time is hardly new, and the point has been made 
repeatedly in the post-War period, by, to name just a few:  Friedman (1947), Meltzer (1987) and McCallum (1994) and more 
recently by Orphanides in a series of papers, including Orphanides (2002).   
Two important lessons have emerged from this literature (Orphanides, 2002: 606): first, the evaluation of past policy must 
be sensitive to the data available in real time to the policy-makers.  For the case at hand this means looking at the Fed’s best 
estimates of output and inflation in the critical years between 2001 and 2005, not an evaluation of what seems optimal with 
the benefit of the revised data. Second, realistic policy alternatives have to be based on data that is both available and 
measurable with a high signal-to-noise ratio.   From this perspective it is not useful to examine the merit of alternative policy 
paths in 2001 to 2005 based on the assumption that policy makers could have known that an asset bubble was emerging in 
the US housing market.  
The quantitative importance of noise in the data on the merit of alternative policy paths was demonstrated through 
simulation by Orphanides (2002).  He contrasts the substantial gains that appear within the grasp of an activist monetary 
authority when they operate with noiseless data, with the substantially inferior results generated by the same activism when 
the relevant data is noisy.  Indeed with noise a much less activist policy rule delivers substantially better stabilisation for the 
economy.  The same result, favouring a ―conservative‖ central banker, emerges when the monetary authorities grapple not 
only with noisy data but with uncertainty about the transmission mechanism and expectations (Orphanides and Williams, 
2008). 
9 These ―nowcasts‖ are released with a 5-year time lag, allowing consideration of the critical 2002 to 2005 period at the time 
of writing.   
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with  deflationary  risks  in  the  wake  of  the  Dotcom  bubble
10  (Svensson, 2009b), for example the 
following extract from the FOMC minutes of the meeting on 24-25 June 2003: 
 
[the  members]  considered  aspects  of  the  Committe e's  communications  as  a  means  of 
underscoring to the public its willingness to follow a sufficiently accommodative path of 
monetary policy for as long as necessary to foster improved economic performance… While 
considerable uncertainty surrounded each individual policy option, the members agreed that the 
effectiveness of these alternative tools, along with the 125 basis points of conventional easing still 
available, would allow monetary policy to combat economic weakness and forestall any unexpected 
tendency for a pernicious deflation to develop. (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2003, 
my emphasis). 
The gap between Taylor’s calculation and that of Bernanke’s does indicate that the Fed systematically 
underestimated the risk of PCE inflation over this period though, which reflects negatively on the Fed’s 
models and the way they were used at the time. But that is not the methodological point at stake here. 
Rather the question is whether the models used by the Fed and other Central Banks were unduly 
insensitive to potential asset market disruptions during a period in which their models, the FOMC 
meeting and informed commentators such as Blinder (2005) did not foresee the emerging risks?  
The connection between an accommodating monetary policy and a boom in the housing market was 
explored by both Ed Leamer (2007) and John Taylor (2007) at the Kansas City Fed’s Jackson Hole 
symposium in 2007.  Using different methods, they arrived at the same conclusion, i.e. that the Fed, 
fearing deflation, had contributed to a housing boom in the period 2002 to 2006 by keeping interest 
rates lower than they would have been under normal circumstances.  And broader evidence, presented 
by  Ahrend,  Cournède,  and  Price  (2008)  for  the  OECD  countries  as  a  group  supports  the  same 
hypothesis,  i.e.  low  interest  (lower  than  suggested  by  Taylor  rules  for  the  individual  countries) 
contributed significantly to booms in residential property internationally.  
A connection between the stance of monetary and a housing bubble is insufficient though as the 
magnitude of the crisis cannot be understood without understanding the increased leverage of banks 
and  other  financial  institutions  (Blanchard,  2009).    While  low  interest  rates  helped  to  finance  the 
housing boom more cheaply, recent theoretical work suggests that low interest rates might also increase 
leverage in the financial sector along two channels (Borio and Zhu, 2008; Adrian and Shin, 2009): first 
the low nominal returns on cash might encourage financial firms to pursue higher yielding (and more 
risky) investments; this is especially relevant for financial firms who are contracted to deliver a given 
                                                 
10 John Muellbauer (2007) argued that the Fed’s concern with the risk of deflation was a misplaced fear that the Japanese 
episode of the 1990s could be repeated in the USA.   
9 
nominal return. Second, the effect of low interest rates on asset prices and cash flows might allow 
financial firms to carry more risky investments while their balance sheets will appear sound.  
Gambacorta (2009) investigated the empirical relevance of these hypotheses for the current crisis and 
more generally for Europe and the USA with a database of 600 listed banks.  His empirical results 
suggest that the period of low interest rates discussed here contributed importantly to higher risk taking 
at European and American banks
11.  
An interim conclusion at this point is that monetary policy contributed in two ways to the financial 
crisis: first, discretionary lower interest rates fuelled a boom in housing market internationally, and 
especially in the USA.  Without this boom it is hard to envisage the crisis as it actually unfolded.  
Second, the increased leverage in the financial sector, whic h magnified the effect of the crisis far 
beyond the size of sub-prime market, was also related to low interest rates that encouraged investment 
banks and other financial institutions to adopt ever more risky investment strategies.  The puzzle is why 
the models of the economy used by the Central Banks did not alert them to these risks ex ante.  
4. What role for monetary models in the crisis?  
A remarkable consensus developed on the theory and practice of monetary policy since the 1970s.  In 
practice  this  consensus  is  seen  in  the  rise  of  explicit  and  implicit  flexible  inflation  targeting 
(Goodfriend,  2005;  Svensson,  2006),  a  system  whereby  a  central  bank  aims  at  stabilising  inflation 
around a low numerical target, while giving some weight to output fluctuations in its objective function.  
This is a forward-looking approach to monetary policy - often called forecast targeting - in which 
expectations play a critical role.  This forward-looking approach in practice reflects the influence of 
rational expectations models and their implications for credibility and commitment (Goodfriend, 2005).  
Theoretically the consensus model, a New-Keynesian model, is a dynamic general equilibrium model 
built around a real business cycle core, with rational expectations and price stickiness (Goodfriend, 
2005).  A popular heuristic unfolds the model in three equations (Clarida et al., 1999; Goodhart, 2005), 
though the actual implementation in policy models sees various extensions and elaboration. The first 
equation of the consensus model expresses the relationship between real expenditure on one side and 
monetary  and  other  shocks  on  the  other,  i.e.  it  is  the  modern  forward-looking  version  of  an  IS 
relationship
12.  This part of the model has substantial empirical support (Goodhart, 2005: 4).  
                                                 
11 There were many other factors such as regulatory mistakes or even ―holes‖ in financial regulation as well as psychological 
factors such as overoptimism that played a role in the increased leverage and perverse incentives that encouraged risk taking 
in the banking sector (Blanchard, 2009; Roberts, 2010).   
12 Models used by central banks in the policy process will usually disaggregate this IS relationship in a number of constituent 
relationships by different types of real expenditure (Goodhart, 2005: 3-4).   
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Aggregate supply in the model is described by a modern version of the Phillips-curve which relates 
deviations of inflation from some expected path to deviations of real output from potential output. 
New  Keyensian  models  on  the  foundations  of  sticky  prices  have  been  influential  in  this  modern 
development of the Philips curve and many of the models used in research and practice are derived 
from a staggered price setting model (Goodfriend, 2005).  Empirical support for the modern versions 
of  the  Phillips-curve  is  weak  compared  with  the  IS  relationship.    Some  of  the  problems  include 
measurement issues, for example the difficulty in measuring real output and inflation in real time and 
the even more vexing problem of measuring potential output.  
The third equation in the standard model is a policy reaction function that relates the policy interest 
rate to deviations of inflation and output from their respective targets.  Though a money demand 
function can easily be incorporated in the model, it is redundant and in practice typically excluded 
(Bindseil,  2004).    A  policy  reaction  function  of  this  kind  expresses  the  understanding  that  the 
appropriate long-term goal for monetary policy is the pursuit of low and stable inflation with the 
realisation that the long and variable lags of that relationship has output consequences over a shorter 
horizon that should not be ignored from a welfare perspective and cannot be ignored from a political 
perspective (Goodhart, 2005: 7-8).  
The  consensus  summarised  here  is  both  normative  and  positive,  with  the  model  just  described 
summarising the positive understanding of the economy expressed by the consensus.  Normatively the 
consensus can be summarised in a list of prescriptive statements about what central banks should do, 
for example the following list from Mishkin (2007):  
1. Price stability should be the long-run goal of monetary policy 
2. Central Banks should adopt an explicit nominal anchor 
3. The Central Banks should be goal dependent and held accountable to the public  
4. But the Central Bank should have instrument independence 
5. A Central Bank should be transparent, especially through an extensive communication strategy 
6. A Central Bank should have the goal of financial stability
.  
It  is  the  last  prescription  (the  focus  on  financial  stability)  that  is  most  interesting  given  recent 
experience.  It stands somewhat apart from the first five though and is only implicitly captured by the 
consensus on inflation targeting. The connection between the first and last prescriptions is, however, 
made explicit in the literature on appropriate responses for asset price bubbles, where, for example, 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) connected the ―sustained damage to the economy‖ by an asset price 
collapse with a failure by the central bank to act against deflationary pressures.   
11 
But  the  model  of  the  economy  that  guides  decisions  under  the  modern  consensus  does  not 
accommodate the focus on financial stability, as is explained in section 4. The problem is not just 
Tinbergen’s  rule  and  the  need  for  additional  instruments  to  pursue  targets  in  additional  to  price 
stability,  it  is  that  the  financial  sector  (and  its  fragility  or  stability)  is  not  accommodated  in  the 
consensus model.  
Nevertheless,  the  goal  of  financial  stability  is  widely  recognised  (Crockett,  1997;  Goodhart,  2005; 
Svensson,  2009a)  and  brings  particular  modelling  challenges.  The central  bank’s  role  in  prudential 
supervision implies an ability to identify risks to financial stability in a forward-looking manner, the 
ability to assess the risks associated with the current and likely future circumstances of the financial 
sector, conditional on policy actions such as (i) the stance of monetary policy (ii) the lender-of-last 
resort facility and (iii) ―softer‖ instruments such as financial stability reports by financial firms (Bårdsen 
et al., 2006). While all central banks assess these risks, they often do so without the aid of formal 
models that connect economic developments, policy and financial fragility.  
 
4.1 Models used by prominent central banks 
To determine whether Central Bank models provided information relevant to judging the risk of a 
credit bubble it is necessary to discuss models used at leading Central Banks briefly. Models have a 
long-established use in monetary policy, both to ensure consistent and coherent policy decisions and to 
facilitate communication.  
A recent survey of models used at leading Central Banks – by Zhu (2006) – shows that they typically 
use a suite of models that include large-scale simultaneous equation models of an older vintage and 
more modern Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. In practice the DSGE models 
are mostly hybrid models, where the core model is the solution to the inter-temporal optimisation 
problem of the decision makers in the model either with rational expectations or alternatively with 
expectations based on market forecasts or forecasts from smaller time series models such as VARs 
(Zhu, 2006). The European Central Bank, for example, maintains an older large-scale simultaneous 
equation model while also using a DSGE model. Less typically, the Bank of England stepped away 
from its older model completely in 2005 and has since been using a new quarterly model with a DSGE 
core (Muellbauer, 2009). 
These  models  provide  an  input  in  the  monetary  policy  process
13  in these central banks and their 
construction  reflects  the  widespread  consensus  that  emerged  in  monetary  economics  over  the 
preceding 20 years. The transmission mechanisms incorporated in these  models indicate the channels 
                                                 
13 As Sims (2002) showed, the policy process at leading central banks uses model results combined with non-model 
information about the economy, from surveys and other data, as well as subjective judgments.   
12 
along which risks to the financial sector might have emerged as they were applied in the years leading 
up to the financial crisis. Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin (2010) trace the evolution of monetary economic 
thought by the transmission mechanisms incorporated in major policy-oriented models, including both 
large-scale simultaneous equation and DSGE models. They distinguished between neoclassical channels 
(where financial markets are assumed to work without friction, or with frictions in only the price 
process)  and  non-neoclassical  channels  (where  there  are  financial  market  imperfections).  It  is  a 
distinction that will also be useful here, as the inability of the monetary policy to anticipate the financial 
crisis will be closely associated with the relative neglect of the non-neoclassical channels.  
The neoclassical channels identified by Boivin et al. (2010) are the well-known channels along which 
changes  to  the  stance  of  monetary  policy  affect  investment  and  consumption  expenditure  and 
international trade. It is the effect on monetary policy on the user cost of capital, on the exchange rate, 
on  household  wealth  and  the  incentives  for  intertemporal  substitution  that  are  captured  by  these 
neoclassical channels. 
Policy oriented models used at Central Banks incorporate these channels at their core: Boivin et al. 
(2010) describe the investment channel as a ―standard feature‖ in large scale econometric models at 
Central Banks, including the FRB/US model used at the Fed, and in the Tobin’s Q version of this 
channel it is also present in the DSGE models used by Central Banks, such as the EDO model at the 
Fed, the New Area Wide model at the ECB and the Bank of Canada’s ToTEM.  
Turning to consumption, wealth effects follow from modern consumption theory and, consequently, 
are incorporated in the large policy oriented models such as the Fed’s FRB/US model, through the 
magnitude of the effect is small in that model, as in much of the related empirical literature (Catte, et al. 
2004). Intertemporal substitution lies at the heart of the dynamic theory around which DSGE model 
are built, but here too the empirical evidence suggest only modest effects for changes to the stance of 
monetary  policy  and  consequently  this  channel  has  been  de-emphasised  in  the  large-scale  policy-
oriented models.  
The last of the neoclassical channels concern international trade, and traces the effect of monetary 
policy on the exchange rate and then via changes in net exports on aggregate demand. This channel has 
typically been more important in open (especially small open economies) (Boivin, et al, 2010). A typical 
example is the core forecasting model of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), where the policy 
interest rate  determines the prime  overdraft rate  which affects the  equilibrium model for the  real 
effective exchange rate and net exports along that route (Small, Pretorius and Ehlers, 2007).  
While frictions are restricted to the price setting process in the neoclassical channels, non-neoclassical 
channels are those that arise due to a number of other frictions in financial, goods and services markets. 
One  group  of  non-price  setting  frictions  has  traditionally  been  called  the  ―credit  view‖  of  the  
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transmission mechanism and includes the effect of government credit on the credit market, the effect 
of bank lending and bank capital and the effect of firm and household balance sheets (Boivin et al. 
2010). A second group of nonprice setting frictions that have an effect on transmission mechanisms are 
those  that  have  been  associated  with  the  ―new  monetarist‖  economics,  especially  frictions  in  the 
exchange process due to information asymmetries, problems of commitment and spatial separation 
(Williamson and Wright, 2010).  
Common to these otherwise distinct literatures is the central role for financial intermediaries in these 
non-neoclassical transmission mechanisms. And financial intermediaries played a central role in the 
financial crisis, in financing the property boom and in facilitating the gearing of those transactions on 
the capital markets as argued above.  It is therefore striking to observe that these channels are largely 
absent from the modern policy oriented models used by central banks. Neither large-scale macro-
econometric  models  nor  DSGE  models  typically  include  a  bank  lending  channel  or  other  effects 
associated with the ―credit view‖ (Boivin at al., 2010).  
The gap between the standard model and models with non-neoclassical channels emerges clearly from 
a recent frank description of the standard model by scholars who have done much to develop that 
model  over  the  last  decade.  Fernández-Villaverde,  Guerrón-Quintana  et  al.  (2010)  use  a  standard 
DSGE model that is ―used to inform policy in many central banks…[and] that has proven successful at 
capturing the dynamics of the data‖ (2010: 5). Their model consists of households and firms, a central 
bank (with a Taylor rule), and Calvo pricing as a nominal rigidity
14. Money enters their model in the 
utility function of households
15 and the only frictions are those of the pricing sys tem. Crucially, the 
agents are identical since the authors ―do not want to have a complicated model with heterogeneous 
agents that is daunting  to compute‖  (Fernández-Villaverde et  al.  2010: 6). But having made these 
decisions for the sake of consistency with the modern DSGE literature and for tractability, the authors 
are  left  with  a  model  that  precludes  a  role  for  financial  intermediaries  and  the  non-neoclassical 
transmission channels for monetary policy. Policy makers informed by such models would not have 
been alerted to potentially destabilising financial fragility; the financial sector is, in fact, absent from the 
model.  
 
4.2 Monetary models with financial fragility 
To show that financial fragility cannot emerge from the current crop of core models used by central 
banks it is necessary to give content to the concept of ―financial fragility‖.  This is, however, easier said 
than done: there are a number of rival definitions of financial fragility.  
                                                 
14 While they specific a continuum of households their aggregation is trivial due to the assumptions of separable utility and 
complete contingent markets (Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2010: 6). 
15 That is to say without ―sound justification‖ (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2010: 5).    
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One important and intuitively appealing tradition in this literature conceptualises financial fragility in 
institutional terms, with stability defined in terms of the (i) stability and credibility of key institutions as 
well as (ii) the stability of key markets, such that prices reflect underlying fundamentals
16 (see, for 
example Crockett, 1997). In contrast with this emphasis on institutions Mishkin (1994) and others have 
conceptualised financial instability as a disruption in the flow of information in financial markets, with 
shocks - or asset price bubbles  - preventing the markets from allocating resources efficiently.  The 
focus on information and especially asymmetric information highlights the risks of moral hazard and 
adverse selection.   
These definitions are not however easy to incorporate in a model, especially a model that captures the 
welfare consequences of financial instability. To that end Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos
17 have 
suggested a new definition of financial fragility that is explicitly aimed at modelling the welfare effect of 
financial instability that emerges as an equilibrium outcome in the model.  At the heart of their concept 
of financial instability is the combination of (i) high probability of default  for banks and (ii) low 
profitability for banks.  This allows the formulation of a model that is designed to analyse the 
consequences of risk taking by individual banks, the possible contagious relationship between banks as 
well as provide a framework for a nalysing regulatory policy and its effect on financial fragility 
(Goodhart et al., 2006).  
To what extent could the consensus model be expanded to include such a focus on financial fragility
18? 
The concept of financial fragility with bank default and profit ability at its core requires a role for 
financial intermediaries in such an expansion of the consensus model. This will present a real difficulty: 
Most of the core models in the modern DSGE framework use representative agents in the various 
model sectors.  While some of the models specify a range of, say, households, these are typically 
specified in such a way as to render aggregation trivial (e.g. Fernández -Villaverde et al. 2010). Bank 
heterogeneity is, however, at the heart of the concept of financial fra gility
19, and not just bank 
                                                 
16 Identifying the key institutions (those where stress and failure will have consequences beyond the an ―limited group of 
customers and counterparties‖ (Crockett, 1997) is difficult in practice.  The recent crisis suggests that well-informed central 
banks can err in this judgement.  Nevertheless, reforms under consideration for the financial regulation internationally 
emphasise the position of ―systemically important institutions‖.  
17 Important papers in this literature include: Tsomocos (2003a; 2003b) and Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2004; 
2006). 
18 This discussion draws on Bårdsen (2008: 8-13), but the criteria envisioned for an adequate model here differ notably form 
his list.  
19 Heterogeneity in the banking sector is critical for a model of financial fragility: in a representative agent model either all 
banks (the bank) will fail, or not, while the feature of financial fragility that is of interest here is the failure of some banks, 
while others survive, perhaps in a more fragile condition. Further there is no possibility of an inter-bank market (the source 
of much contagious interaction between banks and prominent in this regard in the present crisis) without heterogeneous 
banks (Goodhart et al., 2006).  
Some DSGE models have incorporated financial friction by way a financial accelerator, in which a representative agent 
model with asymmetric information generates balance sheet effects for the firm through one-period stochastic optimal debt-
contracts with costly verification.  Though this is a successful strategy to include balance sheet effects, it does not create any 
role for banks in the model, nor is there any room for regulatory policies in a framework where the equilibrium is always 
constrained efficient (Goodhart et al., 2010: 2).   
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heterogeneity  but  the  possibilities  of  trade  and  default  require  heterogeneity  across  other  decision 
makers in the model too.  
More than heterogeneity is required though; the financial sector in the model, and money as an asset, 
has to affect the real outcomes of the model; money must not be redundant as it often is in the 
consensus model. For money to assume this role though it is necessary to assume incomplete financial 
markets and liquidity risk.  With missing markets the decision makers are unable to hedge against all 
possibilities, and this introduces a feature common to financial crises, i.e. unanticipated events of low 
probability but extreme consequences. The missing markets assumption also links with the requirement 
of a policy model, as the incompleteness of markets creates, at least in principle, scope for welfare-
enhancing policy intervention.  
A stochastic  element could  be added  to such a model by allowing  shocks to the  macroeconomic 
environment that would affect the ability of different decision makers to honour their debt obligations 
and the terms on which banks are willing to contract with private decision makers, thus creating a 
credit  channel.  Goodhart  et  al.  (2004)
20  have shown that a model along these lines can gen erate 
heterogeneous default probabilities and these together with fluctuations on bank profitability generate 
financial fragility as an equilibrium outcome in the model. With default as equilibrium outcome the 
model would be able to trace contagion effects  too, for example by assessing the risk of contagion in 
the inter-bank market and credit markets.  
This kind of heterogeneity, where different kinds of households, intermediaries and firms face different 
budget constraints, different balance sheets, information sets and information costs show the type of 
microfoundations required for a monetary policy model that would be suitable to analyse financial 
fragility as a core concern of policy model
21. It is not the microfoundations of the DSGE models used 
in core monetary policy models though
22.  
  
                                                 
20 Goodhart et al (e.g. 2006 and 2004) builds on earlier work in this direction by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2000) 
and Shubik and Wilson (1977). 
21 The RAMSI model under development at the Bank of England (discussed below) is an example of the microeconomic 
foundations envisioned here.  
22 Hoover (2010) identified three distinct programs to develop microfoundations for macroeconomic models, which he 
called the (i) the aggregation programme, (ii) the general-equilibrium programme, and (iii) the representative-agent 
programme. The microfoundations described above are closer to the heterogeneity that Hoover identified in Keynes and 
the aggregation programme of Klein. 
By contrast, the microfoundations used almost universally in modern macroeconomics is of the representative agent kind, 
on the shortcomings of which see Hoover (2008, 2009 and 2010).  The tremendous problems of aggregation and the 
problems of working with the utility function of a representative agent as if the connection to the utility functions of 
individuals is not deeply problematic (and perhaps insurmountable) has never been answered (Hoover, 2010). Under these 
circumstances the widespread adoption of representative agent models has the character of an ideological response (Hoover, 
2009).     
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Two recent examples demonstrate the potential of models that satisfy the criteria mapped out above: 
Recently,  Goodhart,  Osorio and Tsomocos  (2010) offered  a model  that satisfies the  requirements 
mapped out above (allowing for default in both mortgage and credit markets) and that has been applied 
to questions raised by the financial crisis. To demonstrate the potential use of the model they examined 
a situation where the economy is hit by an initial adverse supply shock, which they relate to rising oil 
and  commodity  prices  in  the  US  and  developed  world  over  the  period  2004  to  2008.    Monetary 
authorities responded to this supply shock by raising interest rates to contain the inflationary risk, but 
this put pressure on house prices in the USA and contributed to the sub-prime mortgage crisis. The 
model also allows them to trace emergent financial fragility (and the role of monetary policy in creating 
these pressures) as households defaulted and the profitability of banks declined. 
The second example is the Risk Assessment Model for Systemic Institutions (RAMSI) model under 
development at the Bank of England, which is designed to assess on a bank-by-bank and system-wide 
basis for the financial sector in the United Kingdom (Aikman et al, 2009). At the model’s core is a 
highly disaggregated and heterogenous financial sector reflecting the balance sheets of the ten largest 
banks in the UK at the end of 2007. The structure of the model allows for extensive balance sheet 
interdependence and liability-side feedback in the financial sector. As a demonstration they showed 
how, in their model, a single bank which defaults for fundamental reasons causes two other banks to 
fail,  the  second  because  of  a  loss  of  confidence  (that  exacerbates  existing  vulnerabilities)  due  to 
perceived similarities with the first failing bank and the third due to counterparty losses and mark-to-
market balance sheet deterioration caused by the asset sales of the other two failing banks.  
It is the departure from representative agents that is the major break for these models relative to the 
current vintage of DSGE models. But in other respects the distance to mainstream models is not so 
large: they are dynamic equilibrium models and though the model can have the structure to generate 
model consistent expectations, e.g. Goodhart et al. (2004), that need not be imposed, e.g. Aikman et al. 
(2009).  This  is  not  to  minimise  the  importance  of  the  representative  agent  approach  to 
microfoundations to mainstream models, but as Hoover (2010) has demonstrated, that part of modern 
macroeconomic  method  has  never  rested  on  firm  foundations.  Rejecting  representative  agents  is 
rejecting  an  ideological  stance  (Hoover,  2009)  rather  than  a  solidly  defended  part  of  modern 
macroeconomic models. 
Having said that the immediate prospects of a generalised monetary policy model that include the 
methodological prescriptions developed above are dim.  The existing examples are focussed on narrow 
questions  relating  specifically  to  financial  regulation  and  are  not  designed  to  assist  in  forecasting 
inflation, or the output gap or many of the tasks performed by the core policy models.   
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By implication models developed along these lines will not replace the core policy models in use at 
central banks but will add to the information used in the policy process. This begs the question of how 
a new model should be added to the suite of models used by monetary authorities, how it will influence 
the policy process and what will happen when its recommendations conflict with that of other models 
in the suite?  
To put these questions into perspective it is useful to see how central banks use models in the policy 
process. Sims (2002) reported on interviews with policy committee members at the Fed, the ECB, the 
Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank and for the relevant result was that all of the policy 
committees included a large set of quantitative (and even non-quantitative) information about the state 
of the economy in the policy discussion in addition to the outcomes of formal econometric models
23.  
The use of non-model information is clearly demonstrated by the observation that at two of the leading 
inflation targeting central banks, in the UK and Sweden, econometric models do not determine the 
shape the fan chart  that  shows  a  ―probability  density  function‖  around  the  conditional  inflation 
forecast. (Sims, 2002: 27). Or as the Bank of England’s Inflation Report explained their method:  
The MPC’s view of the likely outcome for inflation in any future quarter can be represented by 
a probability density function… The Committee uses the experience of past forecast errors to 
inform its judgment. But the MPC does not mechanically extrapolate those errors in order to 
calibrate its uncertainty for each forecast. Rather it makes a subjective assessment, based on the 
economic conditions prevailing at the time (Bank of England, 2002: 48). 
Though it is doubtless important, the question of whether subjective methods currently used by policy 
committees  to  aggregate  the  information  from  models  and  elsewhere  is  optimal  from  a  decision-
theoretic perspective is not central to this paper. The point is that they combine the information from a 
suite of models and, to the dismay of Sims (2002), that combination is not a formal Bayesian procedure. 
John Vickers – a former member of the Bank of England’s MPC described this subjective procedure as 
follows:  
Models got two cheers. The pluralist approach to modelling gets three. That is why the Bank, 
like many other organisations, has a suite of models, rather than being wedded to a single 
model... Thus there is no such thing as the Bank model. Even the core model plus the latest 
                                                 
23 There are many reasons for this, including the belief by policy committee members that the additional information give 
them a more accurate picture of the current state of the economy and hence a superior basis for their short term forecasts 
of key variables, in Sims’s words ―several of those involved in subjective forecasting, at more than one central bank, 
expressed the view that the advantage of subjective forecasts is almost entirely in getting the current and the next quarter 
right‖ (Sims, 2006: 21).  The desire to respond to large and unusual events is another reason for the persistent use of the 
non-model information. A third reason is the belief that no single model captures the range of issues relevant to an MPC 
(Vickers, 1999).   
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data are nowhere near sufficient to determine the forecast, since a great deal of judgment, much 
of it informed by other modelling, goes into the making of a forecast (Vickers, 1999: 11). 
The argument in this section therefore built a case for one more model to be added to the suite already 
used at leading central banks. Amongst the methodological prescriptions for this model, the major 
departure from the current consensus model is the need to abandon representative agent models and 
the include diverse and economically relevant financial sector.  
5. Conclusion 
I have told a missing model story: the suite of models that guides policy decisions at prominent central 
banks were not designed to warn against financial fragility of the kind that led to the financial crisis in 
2007-2008.  When, under the pressure of events following the 2001 recession and fearing deflation, 
central banks maintained an accommodating stance for monetary policy there was nothing in their suite 
of models to highlight the associated financial fragility risks.  In that respect John Muellbauer is right.  
But the implications drawn here are less dramatic than his: while the representative agent approach to 
microfoundations now seems indefensible, other aspects of modern macroeconomics are not similarly 
suspect.  The  case  made  here  is  rather  for  expanding  the  suite  of  models  used  in  the  regular 
deliberations of monetary authorities, with new models that give explicit roles to the financial sector, to 
money and to the process of exchange. Recommending a suite of models for policy making entails no 
methodological innovation. That is what central banks do; though, of course, how they do it is open to 
improvement. The methodological innovation is the inclusion of a model that would be sensitive to 
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